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Book Review

Bruneau, T., & Croissant, A. (Eds.). (2019). *Civil–military relations: Control and effectiveness across regimes*. Lynne Rienner. 281 pp. $75.00 (hardcover). [AQ1]

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This edited volume does what no other volume before it has done: examine the nexus between civilian control and effectiveness across a wide range of countries. Civilian control has been a topic of study for decades while military effectiveness has received short shrift. There are just a few studies that go beyond the examination of battlefield prowess, let alone make the connection between success and civilian control strategies. This volume does just that, and in doing so, makes an important contribution to the literature.

The problem with restricting analyses to an examination of war outcomes is that war itself has become a rarity. Militaries are more commonly tasked with a range of activities, from crime control to natural disaster relief and civic action to peacekeeping. What would success mean in these instances? Where missions have no clear termination date, or where success cannot be measured in hard data terms (e.g., sophistication of armaments, number of enemy fatalities, territory gained, surrender achieved), other indicators are needed. Bruneau has suggested in previous work that we must move beyond a measure of action to one of preparedness; that countries should be judged on whether there are plans and strategies in place, institutions to formulate and implement those plans, and resources to ensure that assignments can be carried out. Meanwhile, the editors draw on Croissant's previous research to understand the arenas in which civilian control is exerted and the institutions and resources needed to exert real power and oversight. They then discuss how separate control and effectiveness analyses must come together to understand the linkages between them. This sets the theme for the rest of the volume.

The volume is organized into five sections. The first takes stock of our theoretical knowledge of control and effectiveness along with measurement issues. The next three parts look at empirical country case studies. The editors have carefully chosen them so that there would be variation along three dimensions: regime type, civil–military patterns, and military roles and missions. The first set of countries are established democracies (the United States, Japan, and Germany), the second are

emerging democracies (Chile, Tunisia, and Indonesia), and the third are hybrid and authoritarian regimes (Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and China). A concluding chapter summarizes and evaluates what has been learned from the case studies that were conducted.

David Kuehn's chapter surveys the theoretical contributions of the subfield, noting that while there is no single, overarching approach, significant contributions have been made from different theoretical viewpoints. At the same time, problems remain, including too many definitions and concepts, differences in what the dependent variable is, vague or unstated underlying theoretical assumptions about them, insufficient attention to the relation between control and effectiveness and insufficient theoretical tests.

The chapter on measurement written by Tanja Eschenauer-Engler and Jil Kamerling notes that more large-N studies are needed, but in the same breath admit a serious problem: Quantitative analyses often suffer from a lack of appropriate data and poor concept validity. For example, quantitative studies of coups are numerous, but coup making, and coup-proofing cannot serve as a proxy for other forms of military influence or civilian control. Meanwhile, qualitative studies are well done in their view, but results cannot be extrapolated to a universe of cases. Additionally, data sets on military effectiveness outside of battlefield experiences are hard to come by.

Thomas-Durell Young argues that despite having the world's largest defense budget, the United States has not received a "proven return on investment for all the treasure that has been showered on the Department of Defense." (p. 67). His reason is found in faulty budget control and command of forces tied to an absence of unity of effort and centralization of decision-making. Chapters on Japan and Germany find a common pattern: very strict political-legal constraints on what their respective armed forces can do, which limits their effectiveness. In Japan, Chiyuki Aoi argues that limits can be traced to a deep anti-militaristic ethos in Japan and profound risk-aversion on part of politicians. Internally, effectiveness is measured by how well the politicians scrutinize the military. While this resonates with a skeptical public, it harms external effectiveness externally by constraining the SDF[AQ2] in that it cannot react in a flexible manner. Similarly, in Germany, according to Sven Bernhard Gareis, pacifism is deeply rooted in society, and strict limitations are imposed on what the Bundeswehr can do. However, because North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has demanded more from its members considering Russian aggression, Germany has been pressured to send troops on more external, high-risk missions. As a result of these two competing tendencies, Germany deploys a very small number of troops in order to technically fulfill NATO requests without making a major commitment or chancing the risk of fatalities. The bar for effectiveness is very low, and Germany barely clears it.

In the world of emerging democracies, Chile gets high marks on control of defense policy and oversight and the creation of strong institutions like the defense ministry. What it lacks, says author Carlos Solar, is an overarching national security

plan and grand strategy. In Tunisia, control is hampered by dual chains of command and an absence of defense expertise. Effectiveness, meanwhile, is limited by an absence of strategic planning, funding, and inter-service coordination, according to Noureddine Jebnoun. Aditya Batara Gunawan demonstrates that in Indonesia, progress has been made in reducing the TNI's[AQ3] interference in elite recruitment and policymaking, with the elimination of territorial commands that once shadowed and intimidated provincial governments. However, the TNI still enjoys too much autonomy, often calling the shots when it comes to domestic security missions. The defense ministry lacks sufficient power while parliament cannot exert effective oversight.

In Russia, argues Ofer Fridman, that there is a positive and symbiotic relationship between military effectiveness and strong political leadership. Soldiers will comply with political leaders so long as they demonstrate strength. While the concentration of civilian power in the hands of Vladimir Putin seems to have been beneficial to effectiveness in Russia, that is not so in Turkey, as Zeynep Sentek suggests. President Erdogan has accumulated unprecedented powers to the detriment of effectiveness. Taking advantage of the failed coup of July 2016, Erdogan has concentrated authority in his own hands, purged thousands of well-trained officers from the ranks while shutting down military academies. The result has been a kind of brain drain that has left the Turkish armed forces bereft of qualified personnel and has resulted in poor performance, as evinced in Operation Euphrates Shield.

Egypt is, according to Robert Springbord, an example of no institutionalized civilian control and no effectiveness. Nervous about their grip on power, Egyptian leaders have exerted a personal kind of control by appointing family members and close friends to key positions within the civil-military hierarchy. This combined with other coup-proofing strategies has resulted in a distracted and pampered officer corps along with a bloated military organization which spends more time securing business ventures than it does training for combat. The result has been poor performance in all its missions. By contrast in China, author You Ji finds a positive link between control and effectiveness. While the party still has tight grip on the PLA[AQ4], it does not use its authority to smother or inhibit the military. To the contrary, Party and military leaders share the goal of achieving supreme war fighting effectiveness and work cooperatively to achieve it.

The editors and contributors should be applauded for advancing our knowledge of how civilian control and military effectiveness relate to each other. The nexus between the two is important and can vary tremendously, if not unexpectedly. It is interesting to see how established democracies are not immune from problems that also plague lesser developed nations. Military effectiveness in those countries can be stifled by law, by bureaucratic rules, or by prevailing strategic cultures. Contrary to expectation, nondemocratic control mechanisms can work as effectively as democratic ones in preventing militaries from intervening.

If there is a critique of this volume, it would be in its benchmarks for measuring effectiveness. In some respect, these measures let countries off the hook by

excessively lowering the bar for success. If a plan is in place, as are institutions, and resources are available, then by the editors own reasoning, countries should be rated highly on effectiveness, even if full implementation is wanting. As editors admit on page 236, "... policy priorities that are stated in defense planning often either are not or not fully implemented by defense institutions not only in the U.S. but also in Indonesia, Tunisia, and presumably in Russia and China." Absent are additional indicators and measures for assessing to what degree countries have actually implemented the strategies and plans that they have on paper. With that said, this volume remains an impressive piece of collective scholarship, one that should attract the attention of a broad audience of students, experts, and practitioners in the civil–military field.

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